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History repeats itself: current traps in complexity practice from a systems perspective 
 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the history of systems scholarship and how this has been translated 
into particular forms of purposeful action, like complexity practice. Both systems and 
complexity approaches have something to offer when the situation is no longer amenable 
to analysis based on linear causality or reductionist approaches. In the hands of aware 
practitioners both offer epistemological devices for shifting our mental furniture and both 
are rich sources of metaphors, which have the capacity to trigger new and emergent 
understandings. In the last 70 or so years of systems scholarship those involved have 
diverged into a plethora of traditions or lineages, conserving, knowingly or not, one of 
two epistemological positions: the objectivist or positivist position and the constructivist 
or interpretivist position. These two epistemological positions constitute two language 
communities even though many who participate in them are unaware that they do. The 
trap in all of this is that so many people act without awareness of the positions that they 
hold or uphold and the historicity of their thinking and acting, resulting in conflict, 
rejection, lack of valuing of difference, bifurcation into smaller and smaller communities 
of practice, unethical practice, etc. Based on examples coming from academic practice, 
research management, modeling practice, policy praxis, among others, the implications of 
this lack of awareness are discussed. 
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Introduction 
If we accept that “systems is a seminal word for complexity” (Morin, 1999), then systems 
thinking and systems practice are fundamental competencies in the learning process 
involved in managing situations of complexity of the ‘real-world’. As academics we have 
been engaged with various traditions of systems thinking and practice, and this paper is 
based on our engagement with, and understandings of, the history of Systems 
scholarship, and how this has been translated into particular forms of purposeful action, 
like complexity practice. This has been for us also one of the main reasons to engage with 
the rapidly expanding ‘complexity’ literature. 
As we engaged with both the systems and complexity material and activities of 
those who were enthusiastic about both we began to become aware of a number of things: 
(i) History seemed to be repeating itself, as for example through the repetition of 
concepts and methods coming originally from cybernetics; 
(ii) A lot of the scholarship was, frankly, appalling –most obvious of all was the 
lack of scholarly appreciation of the intellectual traditions on which particular 
claims rested; 
(iii) Yet another opportunity to deal seriously with the important things that 
Systems and Complexity perspectives had in common seemed in danger of being 
lost – in the sense of the fragmenting discourses, interest groups, lack of 
institutionalisation – especially in Universities and in such pragmatic arenas as 
skills and competency frameworks for the professions. This seemed particularly 
tragic to us as these sorts of skills seem more needed now than at many other 
historical moment. 
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Similar concerns have been expressed also by others. For example, on Principia 
Cybernetica (http://pcp.lanl.gov/DEFAULT.html) the authors observe:  
Some recent fashionable approaches have their roots in ideas that were proposed 
by cyberneticians many decades ago: e.g. artificial intelligence, neural networks, 
complex systems, human-machine interfaces, self-organization theories, systems 
therapy, etc. Most of the fundamental concepts and questions of these approaches 
have already been formulated by cyberneticians such as Wiener, Ashby, von 
Bertalanffy, Boulding, von Foerster, von Neumann, McCulloch, and Pask in the 
1940's through 1960's.’ 
These fashionable approaches are usually labelled as:  
the emerging "sciences of complexity", also called "complex adaptive systems", 
studying self-organization and heterogeneous networks of interacting actors (e.g. 
the work of the Santa Fe Institute), and associated research in the natural 
sciences such as far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, catastrophe theory, chaos 
and dynamical systems. A third strand are [sic] different high-level computing 
applications such as artificial intelligence, neural networks, man-machine 
interaction and computer modelling and simulation. 
As we had done, they noted that:  
Unfortunately, few practitioners in these recent disciplines seem to be aware that 
many of their concepts and methods were proposed or used by cyberneticians 
[and systems practitioners] since many years. Subjects like complexity, self-
organization, connectionism and adaptive systems have already been extensively 
studied in the 1940's and 1950's, by researchers like Wiener, Ashby, von 
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Neumann and von Foerster, and in discussion forums like the famous Josiah 
Macy meetings on cybernetics. Some recent popularizing books on "the sciences 
of complexity" (e.g. Waldrop, 1992) seem to ignore this fact, creating the false 
impression that work on complex adaptive systems only started in earnest with the 
creation of the Santa Fe Institute in the 1980's. 
As an example, for Capra (Capra, 2002: 93) concepts like feedback and emergence have 
been developed by complexity theory. We think however the issues are more serious than 
even those on Principia acknowledge – they are issues which are common to both the 
systems and emerging complexity traditions. Therefore, in this paper we want to explore 
what is at issue and why we think they have arisen. We also want to give some practical 
examples of why it matters. To do this we want to start by exploring some aspects of 
what it is to be human so as to invite you to reflect on what it is that you, and others, do 
when you/they do what you/they do! 
 
Explaining explanations 
We start by inviting you to consider ‘explanations’ as a social phenomenon: When is an 
explanation an explanation? For example how many of you would accept Tony Blair’s 
explanation of the reasons for going to war with Iraq? What about Einstein’s equation 
E=mc2 as an explanation of the quantum world? Or the account in Genesis of the origins 
of human beings? 
We will argue that all explanations arise in social relations; following Vickers 
(1965) they give rise to our standards of fact and value. Moreover all explanations arise 
this way but some are conserved over longer time frames than others. Explanations also 
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‘enter our bloodstream’ as we live our lives – throughout our biological and social 
development. Maynard Keynes’ oft quoted remark that in his experience those who 
claimed to be practical men (sic) were usually victims of some theory [or explanation] 30 
years out of date exemplifies our point. Humberto Maturana (see Maturana & Poerkson, 
2004) also draws attention to the role that explanations play in the lives of human beings 
– as young people we seek explanations, inquisitiveness is a feature of children raised in 
supportive contexts, and explanations are something we find satisfying, or not; they thus 
trigger emotional reactions. This is an important qualitative feature that rises from the 
explainer – listener – explanation relationship. 
 
Living in language 
Our explanation of explanations leads us to language. Everything said is said by 
someone. My world is different to your world and that is always so – what we have in 
common are our capacities for perceiving and languaging which both have an 
evolutionary basis. This leads to claims that we live in language, or languaging as 
Maturana (Maturana & Poerkson, 2004) would have it. This is a big issue and we only 
want to provide passing mention to it here. But we raise it because we would like to 
invite you to reflect on what happens in professional life when people belong to different 
language communities (e.g., the systems and complexity language communities). 
Considering language also warrants a brief mention of metaphor. In the research 
carried out by one of us at the OU a comprehensive review of metaphor theory and 
practice concluded that (McClintock, Ison and Armson, 2004):  
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* metaphors are linked to understandings, and can inform research that aims to 
work with diverse understandings; 
* metaphors play an important role in how we use language; 
* metaphors work by 'restructuring' domains; 
* 'Systems' and ‘complexity are a fertile ground for considering metaphors; and 
* a metaphor can be seen as a description, and recognised by the use of the words 
'is' and 'as'. 
One way of summarising this is that if we agree that we live in language then we also live 
in metaphor. But recent cognitive science research (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) suggests it 
could be put another way: we do not use language and metaphor but they use us! 
We do what we do living in language and with a desire to find satisfying 
explanations – and associated relationship making and breaking. Although we live in an 
ever unfolding present, that present is determined by our history and context. We thus 
come to any situation with our own models of understanding. These grow out of 
traditions; a tradition is a network of prejudices that provides possible answers and 
strategies for action or, following Gadamer (Gadamer, 1975), as a network of pre-
understandings (because the word prejudices may be literally understood as a pre-
understanding). Traditions are not only ways to see and act but a way to conceal; they 
arise in the doing and are not labels for ways of acting and constitute the basis of praxis. 
Sir Geoffrey Vickers (1972: 15) conceptualised this same phenomenon using the 
metaphor of the lobster pot as a man trap: 
Lobster pots are designed to catch lobsters. A man entering a lobster pot would 
become suspicious of the narrowing tunnel, he would shrink from the drop at the 
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end: and if he fell in, he would recognise the entrance as a possible exit and climb 
out again – even if he were the shape of a lobster.  A trap is a trap only for the 
creatures which cannot solve the problems it sets. Man traps are dangerous only 
in relation to the limitations of what men can see and value and do… 
 
Different traditions and distinct epistemologies 
From our perspective one of the main characteristics of the last 70 or so years of systems 
scholarship is the extent to which those involved have diverged into such a plethora of 
traditions or lineages. Each lineage represents to us the conservation of a particular 
language community. Some lineages are more robust than others and some have stronger 
institutional capital than others (e.g. bigger societies, strong figure-heads etc). From our 
perspective those engaged in these diverse traditions conserve, knowingly or not, one of 
two epistemological positions. What is more these two positions are already apparent 
with the equally broad and bifurcating ‘complexity’ domain. 
The epistemological positions are: 
(i) objectivist or positivist – for these people ‘systems’ exist in the world and thus 
are describable, discoverable, able to be modelled etc. This is the legacy of 
general Systems Theory and can be typically spotted whenever the phrase 
‘systems science’ is written. It is Peter Checkland’s ‘hard’ systems tradition 
(Checkland, 1999). It has cultural dimensions – more common in North America 
and within aspiring or existing ‘big science’ communities. Within the field of 
complexity the term ‘complexity science’ is also a warning sign. This 
epistemology characterises the Santa Fe group and its publications. It is what we 
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describe as descriptive complexity (Schlindwein & Ison, 2004), i.e. complexity is 
in the world, describable, able to be modelled etc. 
 
(ii) constructivist or interpretivist – for these people the role of the observer is 
crucial – systems are always brought forth by someone in a context. The act if 
formulating or seeing system is a way of knowing about the world, not an entity 
in it. A ‘system’ and the act of constructing a system thus becomes an 
epistemological device – a way of understanding and learning about situations in 
the world. It is no longer sciencia but praxis. In the field of complexity we have 
described this as perceived complexity – something which arises in the 
relationship between someone and a situation (Schlindwein & Ison, 2004). As 
such it is a choice we can make. It is the as if position – let us engage with this 
situation as if it were complex, or let us learn about this situation through a 
process of formulating systems of interest. 
Now these two epistemological positions constitute two language communities 
even though many who participate in them are unaware that they do. They are language 
communities in the sense that we use the term because members of each community 
bring forth different traditions of understanding when they do what they do. They admit 
different claims and thus accept or reject particular explanations. What is more they often 
act without awareness; some act in ways that abrogate responsibility by claiming that 
their explanation is ‘the truth’ or ‘objective’- the path of objectivity to use Maturana’s 
term (Maturana, 1988). In social relations this is at the same time a claim to do as we say! 
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Why does this matter? For us the good news is: 
(i) both systems and complexity approaches have something to offer when 
situations are no longer amenable to ‘mainstream’ practice of analysis based on 
linear causality or reductionist approaches;  
(ii) in the hands of aware practitioners systems and complexity approaches both 
offer epistemological devices for shifting our mental furniture – for ‘managing’ 
complexity; 
(iii) both are rich sources of metaphors – and these metaphors have the capacity to 
trigger new and emergent understandings. 
But what is the bad news? The trap in all of this is not that one position or the 
other is right or wrong, better or worse, but that so many people act without awareness of 
the position that they hold or uphold and without awareness of the historicity of their 
thinking and acting. The product of lack of awareness is conflict, rejection, lack of 
valuing of difference, bifurcation into smaller and smaller communities of practice, 
unethical practice and struggles to build institutional capital or brand around particular 
groupings or discourses. 
Let us briefly give some examples from our recent experience: 
 (i) Academic practice – peer review. Academic publication rests on peer review. 
Those who have been through the process know that it can be a mixed experience. At its 
worst one can become the victim of contradictory reviews which, we suggest, can often 
be seen as contrasting but undisclosed epistemological positions. It is rare in our 
experience for reviewers to state their own epistemological preference before reviewing a 
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paper. Take the following points made by reviewers of a 300 word abstract for an 
international complexity conference: 
• Drawing upon views of French philosopher, Gaston Bachelard, the paper 
develops a poetic, metaphorical framework to understand the complexity 
of human life; 
• The authors need to clarify their use of the term "complexity" and its 
cognates, in particular its relationship to non-linear, dynamical 
"complexity theory"; 
• The idea is original but, in my opinion, too far-fetched and taking for 
granted in very different thinkers similarities in conceptual and semantic 
contents that seem more like only analogies in formulations. 
The recommendations ranged from enthusiastic acceptance to rejection. 
 (ii) Research management. This example comes from recent European 
(Framework 5) experience of one of us as being the coordinator of a five country, 30 
researcher project (see http://SLIM.open.ac.uk). The Framework programmes are 
significant not least in monetary terms: Framework 6 totalled €17.5 billion and 
Framework 7 is projected to be €40 billion. What is clear is that DG (Directorate 
General) Research is unable to orchestrate an epistemological conversation nor is it aware 
of the implications of not doing so. We have empirical evidence of this, having 
interviewed a range of staff from DG Research as well as Brussels-based NGO and 
industry representatives (SLIM, 2004a). Traditionally research projects are largely set up 
as blueprints with outcomes specified in advance (contract deliverables). This has some 
advantages in some types of research and as an accountability mechanism but does not 
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guarantee the best research outcomes or that the research addresses the espoused issues of 
concern. At the heart of this conundrum are epistemological issues and projects can be at 
the mercy of the epistemology of their supervising project officer (similar roles operate in 
most projects). In practice the scope for negotiation and renegotiation of research 
deliverables depends on the relational capital (SLIM, 2004b) that is built up between the 
research project, especially the coordinator, and the scientific officer. 
From our interviews we identified two prevailing epistemological predispositions: 
one associated with ‘Transfer of Knowledge’ with features such as (i) policy blueprints; 
(ii) seeing policy implementation as distinct from policy development; (iii) role of 
‘standards’; (iv) need for new science (facts); (v) questioning the role of social research; 
(vi) need for better communication i.e. a first-order conception of communication; (vii) 
doing research on (people); (viii) complexity as knowable; (ix) consumer and thus market 
focus. The contrasting predisposition was ‘Knowing in Action’ with features such as (i) 
policy as process; (ii) implementation integral to development (of policy); (iii) policies 
adaptive to local contexts; (iv) need for new stories or narratives; (v) recognised a role for 
social research; (vi) learning; co-construction; (vii) research with….; (viii) complexity 
not knowable – new ways?; (ix) citizen focus- ecoliteracy. 
 (iii) The fallacy of the toolbox. Over several encounters between SLIM 
researchers and research managers in DG Research they experienced the pervasive use of 
the term ‘tools’ and gained a strong perception that for many, particularly in DG 
Research, their desire was to have research produce new tools which could be used by the 
clients of research (e.g. other DGs, national actors etc). The way the metaphor was used 
had several entailments: the apparent desire by those who used the metaphor to contribute 
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to making the EU work for which tools (levers, instruments etc) were needed; ‘tools’ to 
fix or remedy particular problems; tools as something that anyone could use. What the 
metaphor concealed however was that a tool (e.g. a hammer) requires a user (a 
hammerer) and something to which the tool is applied (something that has to be 
hammered). Our experience was that those who use this metaphor focus on the hammer 
but rarely the hammerer or the hammered, thus failing to see that hammering, as a 
practice is context sensitive and is ultimately a performance usually conducted for some 
purpose. Within systems and complexity approaches all to frequently a ‘system’ or a 
CAS can be seen as the hammer – a tool not associated with devoid of understanding of 
its historical and contextual derivation and how in context it can become part of a 
performance. 
Concluding remarks 
As we have discussed by means of several examples, the implications of lack of 
epistemological awareness in systems and complexity practices are far reaching, and not 
restricted to particular domains of human activity. In our view the objectivist or positivist 
position is the dominant position in the complexity sciences and its practices, although 
there seems little awareness of this dominance amongst those who claim to be complexity 
practitioners. We assume that the huge effort that has been made to understand (by 
modelling, for example) situations of complexity in their details so as to better control 
and manipulate them, is an explicit manifestation of what we are claiming here. For us 
however, purposeful action in such situations can be carried out through systems 
practices designed to learn how to manage them, which is also a way to refute Rescher’s 
claim (Rescher, 1998) that the complexity of real problem-situations is beyond our 
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capacity to act. To avoid the epistemological trap in complexity practice requires 
awareness, which is also an act of responsibility. Being epistemologically aware also 
opens up more choices for action (Schlindwein & Ison, 2004). 
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